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Summary. We extend Milgrom and Weber’s aﬃliated valuations model
to the multi-unit case with constant marginal valuations where 2 bidders
compete for k identical objects. We show that the discriminatory auction
has a unique equilibrium, that corresponds to Milgrom and Weber’s first-
price equilibrium. This unique equilibrium therefore leads to lower expected
prices than the equilibrium of the English auction where the units are bundled
together. Hence we show that in a common value auction of a single object
where the object can be divided into k parts, it is not possible to increase
revenue by using a multi-unit discriminatory auction. We discuss a possible
application to Treasury auctions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we extend the aﬃliated valuations model to the multi-unit
demand case with 2 bidders and constant marginal valuations. We show
that the discriminatory auction has a unique equilibrium, that corresponds
to Milgrom and Weber’s first-price equilibrium. This unique equilibrium
therefore leads to lower expected prices than the equilibrium of an English
auction where the units are bundled together.
There are some results on multi-unit discriminatory auctions in the litera-
ture. Back and Zender [1] extend Wilson’s [15] share auction model to show
that there is an equilibrium of the common values discriminatory auction
that is equivalent to the first-price single unit auction. The share auction
model is the continuous version of a multi-unit auction as the unit is contin-
uously divisible and bidders can win any fraction of the unit. Viswanathan
et al [14] use this framework to characterize the symmetric equilibria for
decreasing marginal valuations with aﬃliation in the two bidder case. They
also show that in the constant marginal valuations case, the first-price equi-
librium is the unique symmetric equilibrium. However, they do not consider
asymmetric equilibria.
We adopt a discrete model where a number of identical units are for sale
and show that bidding for all units according to the single unit equilibrium
strategy is the unique equilibrium. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [2] use a
discrete framework with 2 units and decreasing private values. They demon-
strate that there must be regions where both units are bid at the same price
in equilibrium even though the valuations are decreasing. Reny [9] proves
existence in the k unit private values discriminatory auction. Lebrun and
Tremblay [4] demonstrate uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium in the
two bidder private values case. Our model looks at the general case of aﬃli-
ated valuations and therefore covers the private values model with constant
marginal valuations.
In order to show that the multi-unit discriminatory auction has a unique
equilibrium standard uniqueness results cannot be used because Lipschitz
continuity does not hold at the lower boundary. In the single unit aﬃliated
valuations case, Lizzeri and Persico [5] overcome this with a reserve price
condition that ensures each bidder stays out of the auction with positive
probability. Our uniqueness result only applies to the symmetric model but
does not require the reserve price condition.
Although the results are of mainly theoretical interest, in section 3 we
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discuss a possible application to Treasury auctions.
2 Discriminatory Auction
We extend Milgrom and Weber’s aﬃliated valuations model to look at the
sale of k units of a good to 2 bidders. Let Xi[x, x], i = 1, 2 be the private
information of bidder i of the value of each unit and S an additional variable
(or vector) that aﬀects the value of the good. The value of each unit to bidder
i is V i = u(S,Xi, Xj) where u is nonnegative, continuous and strictly increas-
ing in all its variables. Hence, we restrict attention to the case of constant
marginal valuations. The variables S,X1,X2 are aﬃliated1 with joint density
f(s, x1, x2) which is symmetric in x1, x2. Let v(x, y) = E[V 1|X1 = x,X2 = y]
and f(y|x) and F (y|x) be the conditional density and distribution ofX2 given
X1 = x. Aﬃliation implies that F (y|x)/f(y|x) is decreasing in x2.
Each bidder submits a bid detailing the price at which he is willing to
purchase each of the k units. The total demand at price p is the number of
units bid at or above p. The market clearing price, p∗ is the highest price
such that demand is at least k. All units bid above p∗ are successful. If the
demand at p∗ is equal to k then all units bid at p∗ are also successful. If
however demand at p∗ is greater than k then the units bid at p∗ are rationed
proportionally. The bidders pay what they bid on the units they win.
We look for Bayesian Nash equilibria where bidder i submits k bids ac-
cording to Bi(x) = {bi1(x), ....., bik(x)} where bi1(x) > bi2(x)....., bik−1(x) >
bik(x) and b
i
m(x) is a strictly increasing diﬀerentiable function
3. Let φ(b) be
the inverse bid function, φij(.) = (b
i
j)
−1(.).
Now assume bidder 2 bids according toB2(y) and bidder 1 bids {b11(w1), ....., b1k(wk)}
where b11(w1) > b12(w2)....., b1k−1(wk−1) > b1k(wk). Let bm = k − m + 1. Note
that bidder 1’s demand for unit m is competing with bidder 2’s demand
for unit bm. His highest bid will be successful if it is greater than bidder 2’s
lowest bid, b11(w1) > b
2
k(y) or if y < G
1
1(w1) where G
1
1(w1) = φ
2
k(b
1
1(w1)).
Similarly, the mth highest bid will be successful if y < G1m(wm) where
1For a formal definition of aﬃliation see Milgrom and Weber [6].
2Milgrom and Weber [6], lemma 1.
3In the appendix (corollary 2) we show that these regularity conditions must hold in
the class of non-decreasing strategies.
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G1m(wm) = φ
2
em(b
1
m(wm)). The payoﬀ to bidder 1 with signal x is
Π(x,w1, w2, ....wk) =
kX
j=1
ÃZ G1j (wj)
x
(v(x, y)− b1j(wj))f(y|x)dy
!
and the partial derivative with respect to wm is
Π0m =
µ
(G1m)
0(wm)f(G1m(wm)|x)(v(x,G1m(wm))− b1m(wm))
−(b1m)0(wm)F (G1m(wm)|x)
¶
(1)
If unit m is not constrained by the unit above or below then Π0m = 0 when
wm = x. This gives the first order condition
(G1m)
0(x)f(G1m(x)|x)(v(x,G1m(x))− b1m(x))− (b1m)0(x)F (G1m(x)|x) = 0 (2)
If this first order condition is satisfied then b1m(x) is an optimal bid in the
range [b1m(x), b
1
m(x)]. To see this re-arrange (1) to giveÃ
(G1m)
0(wm)f(G1m(wm)|x)
×
h
(v(x,G1m(wm))− b1m(wm))− (b
1
m)
0(wm)
(G1m)0(wm)
F (G1m(wm)|x)
f(G1m(wm)|x)
i ! (3)
Since F (G1m(wm)|x)/f(G1m(wm)|x) is decreasing in x and v(x,G1m(wm)) is
increasing in x, the above expression will be equal to zero when wm = x,
positive when wm < x and negative when wm > x. Likewise the mth first
order condition for bidder 2 if bidder 1 uses B1(y) is
(G2m)
0(x)f(G2m(x)|x)(v(x,G2m(x))− b2m(x))− (b2m)0(x)F (G2m(x)|x) = 0
This gives k pairs of non-linear diﬀerential equations,
(G1e)
0(x)f(G1e(x)|x)(v(x,G1e(x))− b1e(x))− (b1e)0(x)F (G1e(x)|x) = 0 (4)
(G2e)
0(x)f(G2e(x)|x)(v(x,G2e(x))− b2e(x))− (b2e)0(x)F (G2e(x)|x) = 0 (5)
where e[1, 2, ..., k]. This pair of equations can be expressed in terms of the
inverse functions,
(φ2e)
0(b) =
F (φ2e(b)|φ1e(b))
f(φ2e(b)|φ1e(b))(v(φ1e(b), φ2e(b))− b)
(6)
(φ1e)
0(b) =
F (φ1e(b)|φ2e(b))
f(φ1e(b)|φ2e(b))(v(φ2e(b), φ1e(b))− b)
(7)
It is clear from (6) and (7) that we have a standard system of non-linear
diﬀerential equations. Let Πim(x, b) be the profit bidder i with signal x makes
on unit m if she bids b.
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Definition 1 Unit m is locally constrained over an interval of bids if Π0m 6= 0
over this interval.
Proposition 1 A unit cannot be locally constrained in equilibrium.
The proof is given in the appendix. Here we give a sketch of the proof.
If unit e is constrained above by unit e − 1 in equilibrium over the interval
b ∈ [c, d] then φ2e−1(b) = φ2e(b) = φ(b) over this interval. We begin by showing
that this implies bje+1(x) = b
j
e(x) for all x ∈ [φ
j
e(c), φ
j
e(d)]. If b
1
e+1(x) < b
1
e(x)
then for b ∈ [c, d],
Π1e+1(x, b) = Π
1
e(x, b) =
Z φ(b)
x
(v(x, y)− b)f(y|x)dy
and¡
Π1e+1
¢0
(x, b) =
¡
Π1e
¢0
(x, b) = f(φ(b)|x)
∙
φ0(b)(v(x, φ(b))− b)− F (φ(b)|x)
f(φ(b)|x)
¸
Let ζ and η be the signals at which b1e(ζ) = b
1
e+1(η) = c. If b
1
e+1(x) < b
1
e(x)
for all x ∈ [φje(c), φ
j
e(d)] then η > ζ. In equilibrium (Π
1
e)
0
(x, b) > 0 for x ∈
[φje(c), φ
j
e(d)], (be is possibly constrained from above) and ¡Π1e+1¢0 (η, c) 6 0
(be + 1 is possibly constrained from below). However, F (φ(b)|x)/f(φ(b)|x) is
decreasing in x and v(x, φ(b)) is increasing in x. Therefore if (Π1e)
0
(ζ, c) > 0
then
¡
Π1e+1
¢0
(η, c) > 0, a contradiction. The intuition is simple. For bids
in the interval [c, d] the profit functions on units be + 1 and be are identical.
Hence, whatever is optimal for unit be+ 1 in this interval is also optimal for
unit be and bje+1(x) = bje(x) for all x ∈ [φje(c), φje(d)].
Since the profit functions for units e − 1 and e must be the same over
this interval and the optimal bids must also be the same, unit e cannot be
constrained above by e− 1.
Hence the equilibrium must be a solution to the set of diﬀerential equa-
tions given by (4) and (5).
Lemma 1 In equilibrium b11(x) = b21(x) = ..... = b1k(x) = b
2
k(x).
Proof. Assume that we have an equilibrium with a decreasing bid sched-
ule at x. Let b be the bid on the marginal unsuccessful bid when both signals
are x. This must also be the highest bid. Any bid at or above this is going to
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be successful with probability 1. Bidding above b only increases the amount
the bidder pays. Hence there must be at least k + 1 bids at b. Let unit q
be bidder i’s highest ranked unit below b, biq(x) < b. Since there must be
at least k + 1 bids at b, bjeq+1(x) = b
j
eq(x) = b. Let x
∗ be the signal at which
bjeq(x
∗) = biq(x). Then for x ∈ [x∗, x], unit bq is constrained below by bq + 1 (as
bidder j0s unit bq is successful with probability 1 for x > x∗ and bidding above
biq(x) only increases the amount the bidder pays). This is a contradiction to
proposition 1.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium is symmetric.
Proof. From lemma 1 b11(x) = b
2
1(x) = ..... = b
1
k(x) = b
2
k(x) = b. At the
point (x, b), the system is locally Lipschitz and there is a unique solution
over any interval [G1e(x) + ε, x]. Setting b
1
e = b
2
f results in equations (4) and
(5) collapsing to
f(x|x)(vp(x, x)− b(x))− b0(x)F (x|x) = 0 (8)
Imposing the boundary condition b1e(x) = b
2
f(x) = b implies that the unique
solution of (4) and (5) is symmetric and is given by the solution of (8) with
boundary condition b(x) = b.
Lemma 3 The boundary condition for the system of diﬀerential equations
must satisfy
b11(x) = b
2
1(x) = ..... = b
1
k(x) = b
2
k(x) = v(x, x) (9)
Proof. Assume we have a solution where bi1(x) > v(x, x). Bidder i’s
expected surplus on unit 1 isZ x
x
(v(x, y)− b11(x))f(y|x)dy
If v(x, x) < bi1(x) then the expected surplus is negative so for x > x, v(x, x) >
bi1(x). If v(x, x) > b
i
1(x) then bidder i with signal x can bid above b
i
1(x) and
make a surplus with a positive probability. Hence bi1(x) = v(x, x). Symmetry
implies that this must be the boundary condition on all bids.
Note that the system is not Lipschitz continuous at the boundary. Hence,
standard results on non-linear diﬀerential equations cannot be applied.
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Proposition 2 The unique equilibrium of the 2 bidder multi-unit discrimi-
natory auction is b11(x) = b
2
1(x) = b
1
2(x) = ..... = b
2
k(x) = b(x) where
b(x) = v(x, x)−
Z x
x
exp
µ
−
Z x
s
f(t|t)
F (t|t)dt
¶
dv(s, s). (10)
Proof. As the Lipschitz condition does not hold, there may be many
solutions with boundary condition (9). Assume there are two such solutions
to (8), bn(x) and bm(x). Consider the solutions at bx where bn(bx) > bm(bx).
From (8) this implies b0n(bx) < b0m(bx). The solution bn(x) must therefore be
bounded away from bm(x) as x decreases which contradicts bn(x) = bm(x).
Hence, if an equilibrium exists, it must be unique. Existence is established by
solving (8) with boundary condition b(x) = v(x, x) to give (10). We know that
b(x) is optimal in the range [b(x), b(x)]. Bidding above b(x) only increases the
price paid and any bid below b(x) has a zero probability of being successful.
The proposition applies to the case where k = 1. Hence, this analysis
shows that Milgrom and Weber’s first-price model does not have an asym-
metric equilibrium and that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In the
multi-unit case with constant marginal valuations, the unique equilibrium
simply involves submitting all k bids at this price.
Corollary 1 The single unit rankings apply to the multi-unit discriminatory
auction.
This follows from uniqueness since the unique equilibrium is the same as
in the single-unit first price auction and we can choose to bundle the units
together and use any single unit auction. Milgrom and Weber [6] show that
the first-price auction is dominated by the English auction in the single-unit
case4.
3 Treasury Auctions
Treasury auctions are commonly used around the world to sell Treasury
bonds and other securities. The Treasury announces the number of bonds
4This ranking is limited to the symmetric equilibrium of the English auction. In the 2
bidder case there is also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria where one bidder plans to
quit early and the other plans to quit late (for a given signal). Some of these equilibria
are revenue dominated by the unique first-price equilibrium.
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for sale, k. The bidders then compete for the bonds by submitting multiple
price bids which are aggregated to give the market demand. The highest k
bids win5. In practice two mechanisms have been used to price the bonds, a
discriminatory auction where the successful bidders pay what they bid and a
uniform price auction where they pay the bid on the marginal successful unit.
The bonds are subsequently traded on the secondary market. If the secondary
market is competitive then Treasury auctions can be modelled as multi-unit
common value auctions. At the time of the auction there is uncertainty
about the price at which they will trade on the secondary market. However,
everyone agrees that the true value of each bond is the secondary market
price.
The empirical evidence comparing the auction price to the secondary
market price is inconclusive. Simon [11] estimates that the experiment of
switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform-price auction in the
1970s cost the US Treasury $7000 to $8000 for every $1 million of bonds
sold. However, Umlauf [13] estimates that the Mexican Treasury gained by
switching to a uniform-price auction for the sale of 30-day bills although the
gains were relatively small. Tenorio [12] looks at the Zambian government’s
sale of US dollars to importers who switched from a uniform-price auction
to a discriminatory one. The conclusion after controlling for factors such as
an increase in the number of dollars auctioned was that the switch resulted
in a loss to the government even though the average price received per dollar
was substantially increased. Goldreich [3] finds that the recent switch by the
U.S. Treasury to a uniform-price auction6 has increased revenue although the
auction price remains significantly below the secondary market price.
Our results demonstrate that an ascending bid auction may do better
than a discriminatory auction which has been used widely to sell Treasury
securities. This simple model does not capture some important features of
actual Treasury auctions such as asymmetric bidders (some bidders are better
informed than others) and trading in the bonds before and after the auction.
However, the intuition for the main result is compelling. Since the bidders
do not learn anything of the other bidders’ private signals, the winners’ curse
plays an important role in multi-unit sealed bid auctions just as it does in
single-unit sealed bid auctions. If the bidders bid optimally, this leads to
lower bids than the case where information about other signals is available.
5Or the bidders submit interest rate bids and the lowest bids win.
6In 1992 for 2 and 5 year bonds and 1998 for other securities.
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Empirical support for the importance of private information in Treasury
auctions is provided by Nyborg et al [8]. They study bidder behavior in
Swedish Treasury auctions where a discriminatory rule is used. They find
that increased volatility reduces the bids. This is consistent with bidders
reducing their bids in response to the winners’ curse. However, they also
find that the bidders disperse their bids rather than submit flat demands as
the model predicts and that this dispersion increases with volatility. The
uniqueness of the equilibrium in the model follows from uniqueness of the
single-unit auction equilibrium and because the constant marginal valuations
assumption rules out any equilibrium where the units are constrained. The
equilibrium is in flat demands whatever the level of volatility. The data
therefore indicates decreasing marginal valuations which could be explained
by risk aversion. If this is a significant factor in practice then apart from
dispersing bids, risk aversion may reduce bid shading on the higher priced
units relative to the risk-neutral case. Whether an ascending bid auction
would increase revenue may then depend on the relative levels of private
information and risk-aversion. There is clearly need for further theoretical
and empirical research to address this question.
This paper shows that allowing agents to make multiple price/quantity
bids rather than a single price bid makes no diﬀerence to the equilibrium in
the 2-bidder constant marginal valuations model if a discriminatory auction
is used. We know that enlarging the strategy space in this way can make
things worse if a uniform-price rule is used (Wilson [15] and Back and Zender
[1]). Although there are no examples of equilibria in the literature that we
know of where the uniform auction does better than the first-price auction,
such equilibria cannot be discounted. Hence a ranking of the ascending bid
auction and uniform-price auction is not possible. Again further theoretical
work is necessary.
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A Appendix
Standard results rule out holes and mass points in the interior of the support
of bid functions. However, we must be careful here as units may be con-
strained. Lemma 4 rules out holes when units are unconstrained below and
lemma 5 rules out interior mass points. In what follows we are restricting
attention to the class of non-decreasing strategies.
Lemma 4 If in equilibrium units m and bm are unconstrained below over
some interval of bids then there can be no holes in their supports over this
interval.
Proof. If only one firm has a hole over some interval of bids, the other
firm will also not bid over such an interval as bidding less will not aﬀect the
probability of winning but will decrease the price. Assume that in equilibrium
units m and bm are unconstrained below and there is a hole over the interval
[c, d] in both supports. First consider the case where both supports have a
mass point at d. Let x be a signal at which bidder 1 bids unit m at d and
[s1, s2] the set of signals at which bidder 2 bids unit bm at d. The profit on
unit m from bidding d minus the profit from bidding d − ε converges to α
times Z s2
s1
(v(x, y)− d)f(y|x)dy (11)
as ε converges to zero where α is the probability the unit is successful in a
tie-break. If unit m is unconstrained above then the profit from bidding d+ε
minus the profit from bidding d converges to (1 − α) times the above and
this must be infinitesimal for d to be an optimal bid. Since (1 − α) is not
infinitesimal, this implies that (11) must be infinitesimal. However bidding
(d+ c)/2 strictly increases profit as the probability of winning is the same as
bidding d− ε but the price paid is significantly less. If unit m is constrained
above then unit m − 1 must also have a mass point at d. Let [t1, t2] be the
(possibly empty) set of signals at which bidder 2 bids unit bm+1 at d. If unit
m− 1 is unconstrained above then the profit from bidding d + ε minus the
profit from bidding d converges to (1− β) timesZ t2
t1
(v(x, y)− d)f(y|x)dy (12)
as ε converges to zero where β is the probability that unit m−1 is successful
in a tie-break. Now if (11) is negative then d is not an optimal bid as bidding
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below d increases profit. If it is infinitesimal the previous argument applies
and bidding (d+ c)/2 strictly increases profit as the probability of winning is
the same as bidding d− ε but the price paid is significantly less. Since unit
m is constrained above we must rule out the possibility that (11) is positive.
If it is positive then (12) cannot be negative as b2em > b2em+1 implies t2 > s2
and t1 > s1 and (v(x, y)− d) is increasing in y. Bidder 1 can then do better
by bidding both units m and m− 1 at d+ ε and d is not an optimal bid. If
unit m−1 is constrained above then repeat the argument for unit m−2 and
so on.
If only bidder i has a mass point at d then reducing the bid from d
to (d + c)/2 reduces the price without aﬀecting the probability of winning.
Finally consider the case where there are no mass points at d. Then bidding
(d+ c)/2 dominates bidding just above d as the price is significantly less and
the change in the probability of winning can be made suﬃciently small by
looking at a bid suﬃciently close to d.
Lemma 5 There can be no interior mass points in the supports of {b11(x), ....., b1k(x)}
and {b21(x), ....., b2k(x)}.
Proof. Assume that bidder 2 has an interior mass point at d in the
support of b2em and that b
2
em is not constrained below by b
2
em+1.
We begin by considering the case where the support of bidder 1’s unit m
does not have a mass point at d. If this support has a hole over some interval
(c, d] then bidder 2 will strictly prefer bidding (d+c)/2 to d as the probability
of winning is the same as bidding d but the price paid is significantly less.
Let x be a signal at which bidder 1 bids unit m just below d and [s1, s2]
the set of signals at which bidder 2 bids unit bm at d. The expression in (11)
is the limiting diﬀerence in the profit on unit m from bidding just below d
and just above d. If this is positive and unit m is not constrained above then
it will not be optimal for bidder 1 to submit bids just below d as bidding
at d increases profit. If unit m is constrained above by unit m − 1 then
the expression in (12) is the limiting diﬀerence in the profit on unit m − 1
from bidding just below d and just above d. This can’t be negative if (11)
is positive. Hence if unit m− 1 is constrained above then setting both units
at d will increase profits. If unit m− 1 is constrained above then repeat the
argument for unit m − 2 and so on. Hence if (11) is positive then bidder 1
will not submit bids just below d. This implies a hole in the support of unit
m below d which contradicts lemma 4 (as both units would be unconstrained
below).
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If (11) is negative then the integrand must be negative at the lower bound
of the integral since v(x, y) is increasing in y. The limiting profit from bidding
just below d is Z s1
0
(v(x, y)− d)f(y|x)dy.
Since the integrand is negative at the upper bound of the integral, profits
must be decreasing in the bid. Unit m must then be constrained below by
unitm+1 (as otherwise we would have a hole below d which would contradict
lemma 4). The limiting profit on unit m+ 1 from bidding just below d isZ r1
0
(v(x, y)− d)f(y|x)dy.
Now since unit m + 1 is competing against a higher ranked unit, r1 6 s1.
Hence the integrand must also be negative at the upper bound of this integral
since v(x, y) is increasing in y. This implies unit m+ 1 must be constrained
below by unit m+ 2 and repeating the argument we end up at unit k which
cannot be constrained below. Hence it is not possible for (11) to be negative
in equilibrium.
If bidder 1 also has a mass point at d then we can repeat the above
argument by considering a signal x at which bidder 1 bids unit m at d. The
limiting diﬀerence between bidding just above d and bidding at d is (1− α)
times (11) where α is the probability the unit is successful in a tie-break. If
(11) is positive and unit m is not constrained above then bidding above d is
better than bidding at d. If it is constrained above by unit m − 1 and unit
m − 1 is not constrained above then bidding both units above d increases
profits and so on. If (11) is negative then the limiting diﬀerence from bidding
at d and just below d is negative (α times (11)). If unit m is unconstrained
below then d is not an optimal bid. If it is constrained below by unit m+ 1
then the limiting diﬀerence from bidding unit m+1 at d and just below d is
γ times Z r1
r2
(v(x, y)− d)f(y|x)dy
where γ is the probability that unit m+ 1 is successful in a tie-break. Since
unit m + 1 is competing against a higher ranked unit r1 6 s1 and r2 6 s2.
Hence if (11) is negative then this integral cannot be positive and if unit
m + 1 is unconstrained below then d is not an optimal bid as bidder 1 can
increase profit by bidding both unitsm and m+1 just below d. If unitm+1
is constrained below then repeat the argument for unit m+ 2 and so on.
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Finally, consider the case where bidder 2 has an interior mass point at d
in the support of b2em and b
2
em is constrained below by b
2
em+1. This implies that
there must also be an interior mass point at d in the support of b2em+1. If b
2
em+1
is not constrained below we can rule out this mass point as we did with b2em.
If it is constrained below then we can repeat the argument for b2em+2 and so
on. Since unit k is not constrained below it is not possible to have an interior
mass point in equilibrium.
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Consider the largest interval [c, d] where bidder 2’s units k and k − 1 are
locally constrained. Then φ2k−1(b) = φ
2
k(b) = φ(b) for all b ∈ [c, d]. We begin
by showing that this implies b12(x) = b
1
1(x) for all x ∈ [φ11(c), φ11(d)].
Consider the lowest open interval (ψ, ω) ∈ [c, d] where b12(x) < b11(x) for all
x ∈ (φ11(ψ), φ11(ω)). The lower bound of the support of b11 cannot be above ψ
as bidder 2’s units k and k−1 cannot be locally constrained below this lower
bound (since (Π1k)
0
= 0). Now observe that since b11 and b
2
k are unconstrained
from below, there can be no holes in their supports over (ψ, ω) lemma 4.
Since φ2k−1(b) = φ
2
k(b) the same is true for b
2
k−1. However, we must be more
careful with b12 as it may be constrained below by b
1
3. The upper bound of b
1
2
cannot be below ψ as bidder 2 will want to bid unit k−1 at the lowest possible
price above this upper bound implying it must be constrained by unit k and
by assumption bidder 2’s units k and k− 1 are not locally constrained below
c and b12(x) = b
1
1(x) for x ∈ [c, ψ]7.
We now show that ψ must be in the support of b12. If ψ > c then this is
true by assumption. If ψ = c and there is a hole in the support of b12 over
[ψ − ε, ψ] then bidder 2 will not bid unit k − 1 over [ψ − ε, ψ]. If there is
a hole in the support of both b12 and b
2
k−1 over [ψ − ε, ψ] then there is also
a hole in the support of b2k over [ψ − ε, ψ]. However, this is not possible in
equilibrium as both b2k and b
1
1 are unconstrained over [ψ − ε, ψ] (lemma 4).
Hence ψ must be in the support of both b12 and b
1
1.
Let ζ and η be the (highest) signals at which b11(ζ) = b
1
2(η) = ψ.We want
to show that ζ = η. Assume ζ < η. Consider a decreasing sequence {ζn} ↓ ζ.
7If bidder 2’s unit k−1 is always constrained by unit k because bidder 1’s upper bound
on unit 2 is below the lower bound on units k − 1 and k then bidding unit 2 at c is the
same as bidding at this upper bound since in either case it is never successful.
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From continuity b11(ζ
n) ↓ ψ. Type ζn prefers bidding b11(ζn) to ψ,Z φ(b11(ζn))
0
(v(ζn, y)− b11(ζn))f(y|ζn)dy >
Z φ(ψ)
0
(v(ζn, y)− ψ)f(y|ζn)dy
Subtracting
R φ(b11(ζn))
0
(v(ζn, y) − ψ)f(y|ζn)dy from both sides, dividing by
b11(ζ
n)− ψ and rearranging gives
F (φ(b11(ζ
n))|ζn)) 6 1
b11(ζ
n)− ψ
Z φ(b11(ζn))
φ(ψ)
(v(ζn, y)− ψ)f(y|ζn)dy
Taking the limit ζn ↓ ζ and rearranging gives
lim inf
φ(b11(ζ
n))− φ(ψ)
b11(ζ
n)− ψ >
F (φ(ψ)|ζ))
(v(ζ, φ(ψ))− ψ)f(φ(ψ)|ζ)
Now consider a sequence {bn} ↓ ψ. A type η prefers bidding ψ to bn,Z φ(ψ)
0
(v(η, y)− ψ)f(y|η)dy >
Z φ(bn)
0
(v(η, y)− bn)f(y|η)dy
Subtracting
R φ(ψ)
0
(v(η, y)− bn)f(y|η)dy from both sides, dividing by bn − ψ
and rearranging gives
F (φ(ψ)|η)) > 1
bn − ψ
Z φ(bn)
φ(ψ)
(v(η, y)− bn))f(y|η)dy
Taking the limit bn ↓ ψ
lim sup
φ(bn)− φ(ψ)
bn − ψ 6
F (φ(ψ)|η))
(v(η, φ(ψ))− ψ)f(φ(ψ)|η)
However, F (φ(b)|x)/f(φ(b)|x) is decreasing in x and v(x, φ(b)) is increasing
in x. Hence for η > ζ
F (φ(ψ)|η))
(v(η, φ(ψ))− ψ)f(φ(ψ)|η) <
F (φ(ψ)|ζ))
(v(ζ, φ(ψ))− ψ)f(φ(ψ)|ζ)
which leads to a contradiction.
We have established that b12(η) = b
1
1(η) = ψ where η is the highest signal
at which the units are submitted at ψ. Now consider a signal θ ∈ (η, φ11(ω))
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and let b12(θ) = ρ which by the previous argument must be greater than ψ and
we are assuming it is less than b11(θ). Since b
1
1 has full support on (ψ, ω) there
must be a signal ϑ ∈ (φ11(ψ), φ11(ω)) such that b11(ϑ) = ρ. Now if we replace
(ζ, η, ψ) with (ϑ, θ, ρ) in the above proof (since ρ is in the support of both b11
and b12) we have ϑ=θ. Hence it follows that b
1
2(x) = b
1
1(x) for all x ∈ (η, φ11(ω))
and since the profit functions on bidder 2’s units k and k − 1 are equivalent
for bids over such an interval they cannot be locally constrained.
This also implies that the support of b12 has no holes over an interval
where unit k − 1 and k are bid at the same price over an atomless interval.
We can therefore repeat the argument for φ2k−2(b), φ
2
k−1(b), b
1
3(x) and b
1
2(x)
and so on and use a symmetric argument for b22(x), b
2
1(x), φ
1
k−1(b) and φ
1
k(b)
and so on.
Corollary 2 In the class of non-decreasing strategies, the equilibrium strate-
gies must be strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable.
In the proof of proposition 1 we do not assume that b(x) is diﬀerentiable
or continuous. The results from the single unit literature can be applied since
the competition between bidder 1’s eth unit and bidder 2’s beth unit is not con-
strained by other units. In particular, in the class of non-decreasing strate-
gies, the equilibrium must be strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable, Lizzeri
and Persico[5].
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